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I. INTRODUCTION'
State and federal mining law is expanding to include activity on
private lands, as well as development of minerals on lands patented
under the Stockraising Acts, Homestead Acts and other federal or state
reserved mineral lands. This expansion is occurring not only because
of environmental sensitivity but also because of recent recognition of
the national need for critical minerals. Mining is now concerned with
Wilderness, Scenic Rivers, and Surface Owner Consent Acts as well as
the traditional problems involving air and water pollution. This paper
will not reach all of these subjects, but will be confined to mining law
as it originally developed on the federal domain and the principal
themes which appear in statutory law, including the Federal Land Pol-
icy and Management Act of 1976 and some important case law, includ-
ing recent decisions.
* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the Montana State Office of the
Bureau of Land Management, and Dr. Sid Croff of the Montana Bureau of Mines and
Geology, for helpful information used in preparation of this paper.
I. This paper is intended as an outline of the basic mining law as it applies to the
federal domain. It was originally presented orally at the Public Land Law Conference held
at the University of Montana in Missoula on April 25, 1980. It has been revised, to improve
its readability and to include some changes which have taken place in the interim. Most
noteworthy among the changes are the final regulations for surface management, issued by
the Director of the Bureau of Land Management, November 26, 1980, effective January 1,
1981, 43 C.F.R. 3809.
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II. THE LOCATABLE MINERAL: WHAT ARE MINING CLAIMS AND
MINERAL SUBSTANCES UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL LAW?
A. Historical Review
The origin of "mineral entry" as an American legal concept can be
found in Germanic rather than English Common Law. Free mining in
this system included the right to use water, rights-of-way, and timber.
2
Usually, a ten percent royalty was due on the mineral, as well as a
nominal rental for surface use. These customs were adopted by the
miners in Derbyshire and Cornwall in England and transplanted to
America following the California Gold Rush. There they became part
of the political and economic background of the first American Mineral
Statutory Mining Law, the Mining Law of 1866.1
Congressmen in the northeast had favored a leasing policy to help
defray the cost of the Civil War. Westerners, influenced by their Euro-
pean tradition, favored the development of mining titles and free min-
ing on the public domain. The Mining Act of 1866 legalized what up
to then had been a general technical trespass. It recognized local rules,
customs, and regulations prescribed by local law. Subsequently, the
Act was held to include placers as well as lodes.'
The 1866 law, however, had an important defect, which was not
fully corrected until 1872. It seemed to grant mining rights to lodes or
veins themselves without reference to the surface. Although claims
were limited to 200 feet in length, miners had the right to utilize
whatever surface was necessary to follow the vein. Disputes arose as to
the location of rights to deposits beyond the extent of the claim and had
to be settled in the courts by promulgation of rules for "endlines" and
"extralateral rights."
5
Originally, Section 1 of the 1866 Mining statutes referred to "all
valuable mineral deposits," which was interpreted to include placer
claims.6 Moreover, Section 2 controlled situations where there were
veins or lodes of quartz or other rock in place bearing gold, silver, cin-
nabar, copper, or other valuable deposits. The scope of the Act was
2. 1 AM. LAW OF MINING § 1.1; Morrison's Mining Rights Seventh Ed.-(1892).
3. 1 LINDLEY ON MINES § 17 (1914); MACSWINNEY ON MINES (1897).
4. 1 AM. LAW OF MINING § 1.12; Morrison's Mining Rights (7th Ed.) pp. 9, 10;
15 Stat. 251 (1866).
5. Flagstaff Silver Mining Co. v. Tarbet, 98 U.S. 463 (1878); Iron Silver Mining Co. v.
Elgin Mining & Smelting Co., 118 U.S. 196 (1886); Upton v. Larkin, 144 U.S. 19 (1892); East
Central Eureka Mining Co. v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 204 U.S. 266 (1907). See also
Morrison's Mining Rights (16th Ed.) pp. 219, 222; Montana Ore Co. v. Boston C. & S. M.
Co., 27 Mont. 536, 71 P. 1005 (1903); Whildin v. Maryland Gold Quartz Mining Co., 164 P.
908 (1917).
6. Steele v. Tanana Mines, 148 Fed. 678 (1906). See also Morrison's Mining Rights
(16th) pp. 251, 252.
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later expanded by court decision to include other varieties of metals as
well as non-metallic minerals such as granite.7
The Placer Act of 18708 amended the 1866 law to clarify provi-
sions regarding the location of placer mining claims and expand them
to include all forms of deposit, except veins of quartz or other rock in
place. A placer is usually described as a superficial deposit (usually
gold gravels) in the beds of ancient rivers or valleys. However, the
1870 Placer Act did not limit the claims to valuable deposits, and it
allowed claims of up to 160 acres to be patented.
Both lode and placer claim laws were republished in 1872 under a
single statute entitled the Mineral Location Law of 1872. This law pre-
scribed a smaller size for claims and allowed the location of five-acre
millsites and tunnel claims. It departed from the common law in one
important respect. The apex rule, set out in Section 3, further defined
priority of ownership of veins and lodes and pronounced an "endlines"
principle which would be recognized in the Flagstaff case 9 to settle a
controversy under the 1866 law. Ownership within surface boundaries
was no longer limited to the center of the earth. The vein could be
followed along its full length, beyond the sidelines of the claim, to any
depth. This law still governs most hardrock mining on federal lands.' 0
The locator had two problems, the extent of his claim and proof of
7. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 (1903). "This section (Act of
May 10, 1872, 17 Stat. 91), like Section 2 of the Act of 1866 is susceptible of two interpreta-
tions, either that the words 'valuable mineral deposits' of the first section are limited to the
particular metals described in the second section, or that those metals stood in particular
need of regulation as to the length and breadth of vein, and power to pursue such veins
downward vertically, and even beyond the vertical side line of the locations. This appears to
us the more reasonable interpretation. The fact that no such limits were imposed on veins of
coal or other minerals or metals indicates, not that the Act was intended to be confined to
the minerals enumerated in Section 2, since that would be a clear restriction upon the words
"valuable mineral deposits" in the first section, but that these particular metals stood in
special need of limitation and protection." Soderberg at 533. "Indeed, we are of opinion
that this legislation consists with rather than opposes, the overwhelming weight of authority
to the effect that mineral lands include not merely metalliferous lands, but all such as are
chiefly valuable for their deposits of a mineral character, which are useful in the arts or
valuable for purposes of manufacture." Soderberg at 537-37.
8. July 9, 1870, 16 Stat. 217, 30 U.S.C. § 52 (1958).
9. Flagstaff Silver Mining Co. v. Tarbet, 98 U.S. 463 (1878). "As the law stands, we
think that the right to follow the dip of the vein is bounded by the end lines of the claim,
properly so called; which lines are those which are crosswise of the general course of the vein
on the surface. The Spanish mining law confined the owner of a mine to perpendicular lines
on every side, but gave him greater or less width according to the dip of the vein. But our
laws have attempted to establish a rule by which each claim shall be so many feet of the
vein, lengthwise of its course, to any depth below the surface, although laterally its inclina-
tion shall carry it ever so far from a perpendicular." Tarbet at 467. For further discussion of
claim boundaries, see Silver Surprize, Inc. v. Sunshine Mining Company, 15 Wash. App. 1,
547 P.2d 1240 (1976).
10. 17 Stat. 91 (1872), 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 23 "The Apex Rule," §§ 26, 27 (1976).
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the existence of a valuable mineral. Section 1 of the 1872 Act provided
that all valuable mineral deposits on federal land could be free and
open to exploration consistent with local rules and customs." Early
mining district rules and customs were replaced in Montana in 1895
with what is essentially the definition presently found in Section 82-2-
101 of the Montana Code Annotated (1979).12 The statute defines cer-
tain valuable deposits as veins, lodes, or ledges of rock in place bearing
gold, silver, cinnabar, lead, tin, copper or other deposits. The statute
also allows patenting of placer deposits of gold and other deposits of
minerals having commercial value.'3
The definition of a valuable mineral was modified by the Mineral
Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, which withdrew deposits of "coal,
phosphate, sodium, potassium, oil, oil shale, native asphalt, solid or
semi-solid bitumen, and bituminous rock [including oil-impregnated
rock or sands from which oil is recoverable only by special treatment
after the deposit is mined or quarried] or gas, and lands containing
such deposits owned by the United States including those in national
forests. . . .. 1 from location and provided for their disposition only
by lease. Helium was exclusively reserved to the United States.
In the Common Varieties Act of July 23, 1955,1' Congress pro-
vided that no deposit of common varieties of sand, stone, gravel, pum-
ice, pumicite, cinders, or petrified wood should be deemed a valuable
mineral deposit within the meaning of federal mining laws so as to give
effective validity to any claim thereafter located. It provided, however,
that nothing in the law should affect the validity of any mining location
based upon discovery of some other mineral occurring in or associated
with such a deposit. As used in the statute, common varieties do not
include deposits of minerals which are valuable because of characteris-
tics giving them distinct and special value. It does not include so-called
"block pumice," which occurs in nature in pieces having one dimension
of two inches or more. "Petrified wood" means agatized, opalized, pe-
trified, or silicified wood, or any material formed by the replacement of
wood by silica or other matter.'
6
B. Court Decisions
Some basic definitions of valuable mineral deposits have come out
11. 17 Stat. 91 (1872) § 1.
12. En. Sec. 3610 Pol. C. 1895; re-en Sec. 7365, Revised Codes of Montana (hereinafter
referred to as R.C.M.) 1935; amd. § 1, ch. 4 Ex. L. 1971; R.C.M. 1947, § 50-701.
13. Montana Code Annotated (hereinafter referred to as M.C.A.) § 82-2-101 (1979).
14. 30 U.S.C. § 182 (1976).
15. 30 U.S.C. § 611 (1976).
16. The definition applies to 30 U.S.C. §§ 601, 603 and 611 through 615 (1976).
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of the courts. The discovery rule, marketability rule, and prudent man
rule first arose in the 1894 case of Castle v. Womble. 7 There, the
United States Supreme Court focused upon discovery of minerals of
such character that a person of ordinary prudence would proceed in
development with a reasonable prospect of success.' 8
Later, in United States v. Coleman,' 9 the prudent man rule was
further refined to include a marketability test, or a determination of
whether the mineral could be moved and extracted at a profit. In deny-
ing the application for a patent, the Court concluded that profitability
was an important consideration in applying the prudent man test.2°
After 75 years, the Supreme Court had joined the prudent man test
and the marketability test and said they were essentially the same. The
latter was made a logical extension of the first. This laid the ground
work for some of the rules issued by the Bureau of Land Management
for location and patent2 and for surface disturbance.22 The decisional
analysis also serves as the basis for regulations issued by the Forest
Service for mining in national forests. 23 Not only must the mineral
locator be certain he has a valuable, locatable mineral and comply with
the surface regulations in the development of his claim, but he must
also ascertain whether the federal domain upon which he has made his
discovery is open to location. This presents some special problems.
III. LANDS OPEN TO LOCATION
The mining law of 1872 states that all lands belonging to the
United States, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are open to location.
This was limited to all "vacant, unappropriated, and unoccupied
tracts" in the public domain by the United States Supreme Court in
1922 in Oklahoma v. Texas.24 The Court said that the location laws do
not apply to all lands of the United States but only those held for dis-
posal under public land laws. This restriction excludes location on Na-
tional Parks, military reservations, and acquired lands. Moreover,
location laws never apply where the United States directs disposal
under other laws.2" The question as to what are public lands or public
17. 19 L.D. 455 (1894); see also Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313 (1905); Lange v.
Robinson, 148 Fed. 799 (1906); Jefferson-Montana Copper Mines Co., 41 L.D. 320 (1912);
Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920).
18. Castle v. Womble, 19 L.D. 455, 457 (1894).
19. 390 U.S. 599 (1968).
20. Id. at 602.
21. 43 C.F.R. § 3810 (1979).
22. 43 C.F.R. § 3809 (1980).
23. 36 C.F.R. § 252 (1980).
24. 258 U.S. 574 (1922).
25. An example is indicated by the special acts passed regarding Indian lands. In 1890
1981]
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domain is therefore actually best answered by a statement of what is
not public domain. Clearly what is not public domain is land which
has been reserved or withdrawn for other purposes.
Although some congressional actions appear to encourage mining
on the public domain, such as the Multiple Mineral Development Act
of 1954,26 the Minerals Exploration Act of 195 8,27 and the Mining and
Mineral Policy Act of 1970,28 an opposite interpretation is also possi-
ble. In an article entitled "Is Our Account Overdrawn?" Gary Benne-
thum and L. Courtland Lee made a strong case for the skeptics.
29
Their discussion criticized the substantial withdrawal of the public land
from the operation of the minerals laws. The authors state that nearly
400 million acres have been withdrawn from the operation of the min-
ing law and over 500 million acres from the leasing laws in addition to
more than 170 million acres being administered in such a way as to
constitute a de facto withdrawal from mineral development. Thus,
they conclude mineral exploration and development is specifically pre-
vented or discouraged in an area the size of the states of California,
Arizona, Washington, Oregon, Nevada, Utah, Idaho and one-half of
Colorado. If current policy with respect to minerals under the mineral
leasing laws is added, they conclude that exploration and development
is prevented or discouraged in an area equal in size to all states east of
the Mississippi, except Maine. Their principal point is that these with-
drawals increase the likelihood of artificial manipulation of domestic
supply and prices by foreign cartels.3"
Thus the open, unappropriated public domain is no longer the
trackless expanse that is often imagined by the cramped city dweller,
having been substantially reduced by reservations and withdrawals.
The appopriable minerals have been limited by the 1920 Leasing Act
3'
and the Common Varieties Act in 1955.32 Court decisions have further
the bed of the Red River was made a part of the Territory of Oklahoma by federal statute,
Act May 2, 1890, c. 182 §§ 1, 18, 20, 22, 26 Stat. 81. Two exceptional acts, one dealing with
Wichita lands in 1895, Act March 2, 1895, c. 188, 28 Stat. 672, 876-899, and one dealing with
the Kiowa, Comanche and Apache lands in 1890, Act June 6, 1900, c. 813, 31 Stat. 672, 676-
681, provide a further indication. The Act of 1895 expressly extended the mining laws over
a limited area to which it related and the Act of 1890 extended mining laws to part, but to
all, of the lands to which it related.
26. 30 U.S.C. §§ 521-531 (1976).
27. 30 U.S.C. §§ 641-646 (1976).
28. 30 U.S.C. § 21a (1976).
29. American Mining Congress Journal (1975).
30. Id. Bennethum and Courtland buttress their argument by citing United States Ge-
ological Survey forecasts that within the next twenty-five years the United States will be
100% dependent on imports for 12 essential mineral commodities, more than 75% dependent
for 15 commodities, and more than 50% dependent for 26 commodities.
31. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1976).
32. 30 U.S.C. § 611 (1976).
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defined "valuable mineral deposit"33 and even the term "mineral" it-
self.34 Also, various specific federal laws have made disposition of min-
erals more difficult. 35 The Secretary of Agriculture has been given
authority to dispose of materials from the surface of unpatented claims
(including stone) in addition to the authority already vested in the Sec-
retary of the Interior.
36
One common misconception is that location may be made without
restriction under provisions of the Stockraising and Homestead Act of
191617 which requires all patents issued thereunder to contain a reser-
vation of minerals with the right to prospect and mine. Unfortunately,
in many cases the government failed to make the reservation. On sev-
eral occasions the Supreme Court has held that reservation will not be
implied where the statute of limitations (12 years) has expired.38 The
wary miner should also know that the Taylor Grazing Act of 193439
requires the payment of surface damages. Additionally, the Coal Acts
provide that you cannotprospect for coal on patented lands which have
33. Shell Oil Co. v. Kleppe, 426 F. Supp. 894 (1977). This decision involved oil shale
placer mining claims in Utah that were located in 1917 under the Act of May 10, 1872, 30
U.S.C. §§ 22 et seq. The Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq., subsequently
withdrew oil shale from location but preserved "valid claims existent on February 25, 1920,
and thereafter maintained in compliance with the law under which initiated." Generally,
mining laws require the discovery of a valuable mineral deposit prior to location of a valid
claim, Best v. Humbolt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963), and, the presence of mineral
must not be based on possibilities, belief and speculation alone but upon fact of value. Cas-
tle v. Womble, 19 L.D. 455, 457 (1894). In the case of oil shale, however, the government
has stressed the fact that oil shale deposits would inevitably become commercially marketa-
ble. This inevitability removed the pre-1920 claims in existing oil shale deposits from the
realm of mere speculation and gave them sufficient present value to constitute a valuable
mineral deposit pursuant to 30 U.S.C. §§ 22 et seq. Kleppe, 426 F. Supp. at 904.
34. Andrus v. Charleston Stone Products, 436 U.S. 604 (1978). The issue presented
upon appeal was whether water is a locatable mineral under the mining law of 1872. In
Andrus, water use was a vital aspect of the sand and gravel operations of the petitioner in
Nevada. In concluding that Congress did not intend use of the word mineral in its broadest
sense, the Court recognized that if the term mineral in the statute were construed to encom-
pass all substances that are conceivably mineral, there would be justification for making
mine locations on virtually every part of the earth's surface. The fact that water may be
valuable or marketable is not enough to support a mining claim's validity based on the
presence of water. Andrus at 610-11.
35. 30 U.S.C. §§ 601-604 (1976) Surface Resource Act of 1947.
36. Amendment July 23, 1955, 30 U.S.C. § 612 (1976); see also The Multiple Mineral
Development Act of 1954, 30 U.S.C. § 521 (1976) which allows claims and millsites on
leased lands, except those leased for uranium and prohibits patenting without reservation of
leasable minerals.
37. 43 U.S.C. § 291 (1976).
38. United States v. Price, 111 F.2d 206 (1940); Washington Securities v. United States,
234 U.S. 76 (1913); 43 U.S.C. § 1166 (1976) (12 year statute of limitations); United States v.
Winena § St. Paul Rd., 165 U.S. 463 (1896); St. Louis Smelting & Refining v. Kemp, 104
U.S. 636 (1881); Dredge v. Husite, 369 P.2d 676, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962) (direct
attack on patent by government).
39. 30 U.S.C. § 315g (1976).
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federal reservations without consent of the surface owner or without a
guarantee to the owner against surface damage.'n
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976"' [herein-
after cited as FLPMA], although primarily a management framework
contains a provision which purports to substantially change the 1872
mining law. Section 314 of the Act 42 inserts new filing requirements for
claims. Noncompliance with these requirements subjects the claim
holder to a conclusive presumption of abandonment. 3
IV. LOCATION OF CLAIMS UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
Regulations promulgated under FLPMA 4 mark the end of min-
ing for fun and recreation .4  The chilling effect of Section 3833.4(a) is
apparent from its terms. It clearly states that failure to follow the pre-
scribed procedures will result in a conclusive presumption that the
claim is abandoned and therefore void.46 The procedure of recording a
claim does not make it valid, it merely keeps it from expiring. The
locator must still comply with all other laws. Additionally, filing under
other federal laws does not excuse the filing required under Section
3833 except as to Oregon and California railroad lands47 and National
Park lands.48 If any action or contest arises affecting an unpatented
mining claim, mill, or tunnel site, a locator is not entitled to notice if
there has been no record of the claim or site or a notice of transfer of
interest. The United States will presume the locator does not exist.
Failure of the United States to give notice that the lands claimed are
not subject to location or that the location is otherwise void does not
make any difference. A failure by the United States to challenge the
locator on those grounds is not thereby a waiver and the issue can be
raised at any later date.49
In Topaz Beryllium v. United States,50 a case on appeal challenging
40. 30 U.S.C. § 81 (1976), The Coal Acts of 1909.
41. 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (1976) [hereinafter cited as FLPMA].
42. 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1976).
43. 1 American Law of Mining, Ch. III; 43 U.S.C. 1744 (1976); 43 C.F.R. § 3833
(1979).
44. 43 C.F.R. § 3833.4(a) (1976).
45. Id.
46. 43 C.F.R. § 3833.4(a) (1980). "The failure to file an instrument required by
§§ 3833.1-2(a), (b), and 3833.2-1 of this title within the time periods prescribed therein, shall
be deemed conclusively to constitute abandonment of the mining claim, mill or tunnel site
and it shall be void."
47. 30 U.S.C. § 621 (1976).
48. 16 U.S.C. § 1907 (1976).
49. 43 C.F.R. § 3833.5 (1979).
50. 479 F. Supp. 309 (1979). The American Mining Congress and the Mining Associa-




this regulation, the plaintiff and intervenors alleged that promulgation
of the regulations was beyond the authority of the Secretary and there-
fore void. They also alleged that the notice provisions violated due
process. After reviewing the history of the mining laws, the court de-
cided that both questions should be answered "No." The Court re-
viewed FLPMA and held that Congress gave the Secretary express
authority to promulgate regulations to supplement existing law and
regulations. The Court also held that these regulations were consistent
with the specific legislative intent. The parties also attacked the conclu-
sive presumption of abandonment. The Court concluded that the ques-
tion was amenable to administrative ruling on the facts before the
abandonment was complete and therefore the regulations were valid on
their face. Moreover, the Court determined that part of the notice re-
quirement applied only to a government-initiated proceeding. It did
not apply to litigation involving third parties. Finally, the Court dis-
missed a challenge to the $5.00 filing fee.
51
A case is now pending in Montana which attacks Section 314 of
FLPMA on grounds of substantial compliance, denial of due process
and unlawful taking of property. The claimant had filed papers with
the BLM which properly identified the claim, but was not in strict com-
pliance with all of the filing requirements. The Bureau voided the
claims and the decision was sustained by the Interior Board of Land
Appeals. 52 When decided, this case should directly confront the con-
clusive presumption of abandonment.
The General Mining Law of 1872 provides that mining claimants
must declare their intentions to make claims under regulations pre-
scribed by law and according to local custom. Thus state statutes and
mining district rules have equal standing as procedures for making
claims.53 Mining district rules have now been almost entirely replaced
by state statutes which was not preempted by federal law until the pas-
sage of Section 314 of FLPMA.
The cookbook formula for making a mining claim is contained in
state law. 4 Once it has been determined that the place of location is in
51. 479 F. Supp. at 316.
52. M.E. Rogers v. United States et. al., Docket CV-80-114-H U.S.D.C., Montana
(1981).
53. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1976); Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119 (1905);
O'Donnell v. Glen, 8 Mont. 248, 19 P. 302 (1888).
54. This paper will focus upon the mining statutes of the State of Montana, M.C.A.
§ 82-2-101 (1979), but it should be remembered that the statutes of all the public land states
of the West have similar language. Montana's statute traces its origin to California law, Cal.
Civ. C. § 1426 (1909), now codified and listed in Al. Pub. Res. Code § 2301 (West 1979). See
also, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-202 (1976); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-43-106 (1973); Idaho Code
§ 47-602 (1970); Or. Rev. Stat. § 517.010 (19 ); Utah Code Ann. § 40-1-2 (19 ); Wash. Rev.
Code § 78.08.060 (19 ); Wyo. Stat. § 30-3 (19 ).
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fact public domain and that location can be made without trespass, the
locator must post his claim. The statue requires that he shall post the
claim at the point of discovery in a conspicuous manner.5 Within
thirty days after posting the notice of location, the locator must dis-
tinctly mark the location in each comer or angle of the claim. The
mark can be either an eight-inch tree blazed on four sides, a six-inch
square by eighteen-inch stone, or a boulder at least three feet above the
natural surface of the ground on the upper side. In addition to physi-
cally posting the claim, the locator is required to comply with the
United States mining laws within sixty days. 6 Substantial compliance
with these rules has recently been reaffirmed by the Montana Supreme
Court in The Anaconda Co. v. Wittaker. The holding includes dicta
indicating that the notice of discovery must be posted at or near some
actual point of discovery rather than in the center of the claim.5
The next step is recording the claim. 8 Within sixty days after
posting the notice of location, the locator must record his location in
the county where the property is located and within twenty days after
filing, the county must forward a copy to the department of state lands.
The record consists of a certificate of location for each claim containing
the name of the lode or claim, the name of the locator, the date of
location and the description of the claim. 9 It is extremely important
that this verified certificate be filed because failure of the locator to
properly record the certificate of location creates a prima facie pre-
sumption of intent to abandon.6"
The requirements of annual assessment should also be consid-
ered.61 Within ninety days after the expiration of the federal annual
assessment work period, the owner of a claim must fie an "Affidavit of
Performance of Annual Work" with the county clerk and recorder.
The affidavit must contain the name of the claim, legal description of
the location, book and page number of the claim record, number of
days' work done and the character of the work, dates when the work
was performed, who authorized the work and the actual amount paid
for work and improvements. 62 The annual assessment work may be
55. M.C.A. § 82-2-101(I) (1979).
56. M.C.A. § 82-2-101(2), (3) (1979).
57. Anaconda Co. v. Whittaker, 610 P.2d 1177 (1980). The Montana court reversed a
jury's finding of a valid claim. The court found that there was not sufficient evidence that
Anaconda or its predecessor had actually discovered a vein, lode or ledge of rock bearing
valuable minerals. Also there was not sufficient evidence to show that Anaconda had posted
notice of location at the point of discovery. 610 P.2d at 1179.
58. M.C.A. § 82-2-102 (1979).
59. M.C.A. § 82-2-102(1) (1979).
60. M.C.A. § 82-2-102(2) (1979).
61. M.C.A. § 82-2-103 (1979).
62. M.C.A. § 82-2-103(l) (1979).
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performed or caused to be performed at one or more points within a
group of contiguous claims and may be utilized to satisfy annual as-
sessment work requirements upon the group of contiguous claims. 3
Where group work is claimed for a group of claims crossing county
lines, the statute requires filing in each of the counties in which such
claims are located.6" Additionally the affidavit must be verified before
some officer authorized to administer oaths and, as with the other re-
quirements, failure to properly comply is prima facie evidence of intent
to abandon the claim. 5 Finally, compliance must then be made with
Section 314 of FLPMA by filing the requirement documents with the
state office of the Bureau of Land Management. 6
V. THE PROCESS FOR OBTAINING A MINERAL PATENT
The mineral patent application process is the subject of a fine pub-
lication by the Bureau of Land Management.
67
It should only be necessary at this point to recite an outline of its
contents with a minimum of discussion and remind the reader of the
marketability test from United States v. Coleman, supra.
A. Applications
Applications must include a correct, approved survey made subse-
quent to location in accordance with the 1947 manual for survey of
public lands. Plat and field notes must accompany the patent applica-
tion. In addition, the applicant must file a certificate of expenditures of
at least $500 per location, and a mineral surveyor's report including
only those expenditures and improvements of the current applicant.68
Next, the applicant must make a public notification of his claim.
A plat of the survey must be posted on the claim and proof of posting
must be filed with the manager. As a part of these notice requirements,
two copies of the plat, field notes, notice and a statement of notice
signed by two witnesses must be submitted.
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At the time of posting, lodes and placers require duplicate applica-
tions for patent. The application must show that the claimant has a
possessory right under state and federal law, including a brief state-
ment of facts of compliance, origin of possession, the basis of the claim
and a full description of the kind and character of the lode. There must
63. M.C.A. § 82-2-103(2) (1979).
64. M.C.A. § 82-2-103(3) (1979).
65. M.C.A. § 82-2-103(4) (1979).
66. 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1976).
67. Bureau of Land Management, Dept of Int. Cir. No. 2289.
68. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3861.1-1; 3861.1-2; 3861.1-3; 3761.2-1; 3861.2-2; 3861.2-3 (1979).
69. 43 C.F.R. § 3861 (1979).
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be a specific declaration for each lode claimed, any undeclared lode is
excluded from the claim. If the declaration is for another mineral, the
claimant must state why the deposit is regarded to be a valuable min-
eral.7 °
Specifically, placer applications need to include an additional
statement that the applicant is not trying to control a water course or to
obtain timber. The applicant must make a good faith attempt to de-
velop the mineral deposit and include the gold yield per pan or cubic
yards. Also, while mill sites are patentable by both lode and placer
claimants, substantiation of the non-mineral character of the land is
required from two witnesses.7' Upon review the Bureau may require
that the applicant amend the survey and bear the expenses of the new
survey. The qualifications, employment and payment of mineral sur-
veyors is specifically described by regulation.72
B. Adjudication-Under Administrative Procedure
The application for a mineral patent will be scoured for accuracy
and a reasonable time allowed to correct any deficiency. Full posses-
sory title must be verified by the Solicitor for the Department. The
proposed publication of notice will be approved and the applicant will
be advised what newspaper is to be used for publication (the applicant
is responsible for the cost of publication). Publication will be in the
Wednesday issue of a daily or in each issue of a weekly for nine succes-
sive weeks (sixty days is computed excluding the first day of the issues).
Proof of publication and posting must be made.73
If no adverse claim is filed during the sixty-day period and no
other objection appears, under the old law the applicant could purchase
the lode at $5.00 an acre or the placer at $2.50 an acre. The price is
now fair market value and entry will not be allowed until all required
proofs are made.74
C. Adverse Claims
Adverse claims75 are to be filed in the same office where the patent
application is filed by any person affected, his agent or attorney-in-fact
with proof of agency or power of attorney. The adverse claim must
fully set forth the conflict and state whether the claimant is a purchaser
or a locator. If a locator is involved, a certified copy of the location or
70. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3862.1-1; 3863.1-3 (1979).
71. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3863.1-3(a); 3864.1-1 (1979).
72. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3861.2-5; 3861.3-1 (1979).
73. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3862.4-6; 3863.1(b) (1979).
74. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3862.4-6; 3863.1(b) (1979).
75. 43 C.F.R. § 3871.1 (1979).
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an abstract must be filed (or if verbal, a narration of the circumstances).
Additionally, a plat must be filed (if no legal subdivision is involved)
and an official survey must be performed.76
The BLM state manager will then give notice in writing that the
adverse party has thirty days to commence a court action, otherwise the
adverse claim is considered waived and the patent proceeding will be
completed. There are different requirements for applications on
Alaska land77 and those filed prior to the effective date of the Act.78 A
court of competent jurisdiction under this procedure is either a state or
federal court of general jurisdiction. 79 The successful party then must
file a certified copy of the judgment as well as the mineral surveyor's
certificate that the labor has been done, and pay the price before a pat-
ent can issue. If no suit is commenced by an adverse claimant the ap-
plicant must fie a certificate to that effect by the clerk of the state
having jurisdiction and the clerk of the United States district court for
the district where the claim is situated."0
D. Protests
Protests may also be filed on any ground tending to show that the
applicant has failed to comply in an essential matter. A protestant must
also pay a $10.00 fee. A joint or co-interest holder can protest to pre-
serve his interest because he is not deemed an adverse claimant, but a
protest can not be filled by a losing adverse claimant in a court action.8'
Jurisdiction is retained by the Bureau of Land Management, although
76. 43 C.F.R. § 3871.2 (1979).
77. 30 C.F.R. § 29.30 (1979).
78. 43 C.F.R. § 3871.3(h) (1979).
79. Blackburn v. Portland Gold Mining Co., 175 U.S. 571 (1900); Chambers v. Har-
rington, Ill U.S. 350 (1884). "The first observation to be made is that Congress did not
intend or prescribe jurisdiction in any particular court, state or federal. 'It shall be the duty
of the adverse claimant, within thirty days after filing his claim, to commerceproceedings in a
court of competent jurisdiction, to determine the question of the right of possession, and to
prosecute the same with reasonable diligence to final judgment.' The natural inference from
this language is that the competency of the adjudicating court was not to be determined by
the mere fact that the mining claims in controversy consisted of lands the title to which was
in the United States." Blackburn at 578-79.
80. 43 C.F.R. § 3871.6 (1979).
81. Turner v. Sawyer, 150 U.S. 578 (1893). Turner involved a co-tenant situation. Tur-
ner had acquired an interest in a mine by payment of a wage claim for the annual work and
sought to have Sawyer's interest transferred to him. Co-tenants who purchase outstanding
titles or incumbrances, inure for benefits to all tenants and when acquired the co-tenant
holds the interest in trust for fellow tenants. Turner at 586. The Court also cited Garland v.
Wynn, 61 U.S. 6, 20 How. 6 (1857) and Monroe Cattle Co. v. Becker, 147 U.S. 47 (1892), for
the proposition that where several parties set up conflicting claims, with which a special
tribunal may deal, as between one party and the government, regardless of the rights of
others, the later may come into ordinary courts of justice and litigate the conflicting claim.
Turner at 587.
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the agency proceedings will be stayed pending court proceedings where
both the appellant and the adverse party are considered plaintiffs8 2
VI. EMERGING FEDERAL POLICY
The Mining and Mineral Policy Act of 197083 must be read in con-
junction with the provisions of FLPMA84 because its provisions are
specifically referred to in the Congressional declaration of policy. The
public lands are to be managed in a manner which recognizes the na-
tion's need for domestic sources of minerals, food, timber, and fiber
from the public lands. The policy expressly recognizes implementation
of the Mining and Mineral Policy Act of 1970 as it pertains to the pub-
lic lands.8 Therefore, it can be concluded that at least as of 1976, it
was in the national interest to encourage private enterprise in the devel-
opment of sound and stable domestic mining, minerals, metal and min-
eral reclamation industries to help assure satisfaction of industrial,
security and environmental needs. Such a policy includes stimulation
of mining, mineral and metalurgical research to encourage both the
recycling of the materials themselves and development of methods for
disposal, control and reclamation of mineral waste products and recla-
mation of mineral land so as to lessen the adverse environmental im-
pact of mineral extraction and processing. 6 In fact, Congress has
delegated the promotion of this policy to the Secretary of the Interior
who is also required to submit a statement regarding the current status
of mineral development along with recommendations for new legisla-
tive programs in his annual report to Congress. 7 The development of
this policy provides a good example of the conflict into which the Con-
gress has placed the Department of the Interior. The original rule-
making procedure contained objectives that permitted mining only
under conditions that prevented unnecessary or undue degradation and
provided protection of non-mineral resources on federal lands.88
The new and final rules state that the objectives of regulation are
to provide for mineral entry pursuant to the mining laws in a manner
that will not unduly hinder such activities, provide for reclamation of
82. Brown v. Gurney, 201 U.S. 184 (1906); see also: Recent administrative decision,
James E. Strong, Interior Board of Land Appeals 2-13-80 Determination of abandonment
and voidness was set aside even though there was no date stamp or local record and all the
BLM was given was a copy of what he was supposed to have filed. Since he had filed before
the new rules (43 C.F.R. § 3833) he was held to have given notice under the old rules. Refer
to: McKay v. Wahlenmaier, 266 F.2d 35 (1955) for authority relied on by IBLA.
83. 30 U.S.C. § 21a (1976).
84. 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976).
85. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(12) (1976).
86. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8), (12) (1976).
87. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(5) (1976).
88. 43 C.F.R. § 3809 (1980).
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disturbed areas and coordinate, to the greatest extent possible, with ap-
propriate state agencies, procedures for prevention of unnecessary or
undue degradation with respect to mineral operations. These objec-
tives now place their emphasis on mineral operations. They emphasize
that mining will go forward on the federal domain and will not be pre-
vented by other considerations. The objective is to provide adequate
protection from degradation with the least possible burden to the min-
ing industry.89
The introduction to the new regulations contains eight detailed
pages of discussion of public comments on the draft. This is an inter-
esting post-mortem on the conflict which occurred during the hearing
process. The result is a compromise regulation which establishes three
levels of mining activity. The first "casual use" is not regulated at al.
It is designed for the weekend miner or prospector who creates only
negligible disturbance. The second, which covers disturbance of five
acres or less, requires only notice to the BLM fifteen days before the
activity starts. No approval or bonding is required. Operators of
claims larger than five acres are required to submit a detailed mining
plan, bonding may be required, and the BLM must act on the applica-
tion within thirty days or waive its objections.90
This regulation represents a recognition of the national policy to
encourage mining on the federal domain, with respect to al lands open
to location. It expressly excludes lands in wilderness or under consider-
ation for wilderness designation. The Wilderness Act allows applica-
tion of the mining laws until midnight, December 31, 1983.91
VII. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
In order to place the Department of Interior's burden of develop-
ing mining on the federal domain with adequate environmental protec-
tion in perspective, certain recent cases should be reviewed. In South
Dakota v. Andrus,92 a case which involved a mineral patent application
for twelve mining claims (twenty acres each) in the Black Hills Na-
tional Forest, the applicant claimed a discovery of 160 million tons of
low grade iron ore. The mining plan was to remove seven million tons
a year and process them into pellets. The BLM contested the patent
application at the request of the Forest Service on the grounds that
there was no discovery of a valuable deposit. The state then intervened
and raised the question of environmental compliance before the Inte-
rior Board of Land Appeals. The state said that a project which would
89. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.0-2 (1980).
90. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3809.1-2, 3809.1-3, 3809.1-4 (1980).
91. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1976).
92. 614 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir. 1980).
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take 240 to 1,140 acres of land from a national forest and discard 2.3
million tons of waste a year required an environmental impact state-
ment. The Board held that no environmental impact statement was
required but remanded the case for hearing on other grounds.
The state sued in federal court to compel preparation of an envi-
ronmental impact statement under the National Environmental Protec-
tion Act93 before the mineral patent could issue. In affirming the
district court, the circuit court agreed that the issuance of the patent is a
ministerial act and not covered by the National Environmental Protec-
tion Act. The court reasoned that the issuance of the patent does not
allow the private party to do anything, so the granting of the patent was
not a major federal action. The question of whether an environmental
impact statement was required in the discharge of the Secretary's duties
under the mining laws was not reached and therefore not discussed.
It appears that the question of major action might be raised in any
case where a plan would be filed under the Surface Management regu-
lation.94 What is "major" will then be a question of fact for the De-
partment, the applicant and the courts. In Andrus, the Eighth Circuit
expressed doubt as to this question and referred in a footnote to Natural
Resources Defense Counsel v. Berklund.9s Therein, the D.C. Circuit
had held that the words "the fullest extent possible" in Section 102(1)
of the National Environmental Policy Act limits the act by any existing
statutory scheme which conflicts with it. The Secretary was held to
have no discretion but to grant a coal lease in that case. Although the
court recognized that environmental analysis would be required where
possible as required by the Act, action on the lease could not be denied
or prevented.
The words of the D.C. Circuit are significant because of the mar-
ketability test of Coleman 96 The agency requires a demonstration that
the estimated revenues of a project can reasonably be expected to ex-
ceed estimated costs. Moreover, for some lease applications outstand-
ing under the former version of the provision, the property rights
anticipated by the permittee applicants can not be diminished. Where
environmental damage from granting leases to entitled parties is cer-
tain, the Secretary is authorized to negotiate an exchange for other
mineral leases of similar value.97 Since it appears that a coal lessee is
entitled to an exchange when environmental problems block his mining
93. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1976).
94. 614 F.2d at 1195.
95. 609 F.2d 553 (1979).
96. 390 U.S. 599 (1968).
97. 43 C.F.R. § 3520.1(c) (1979).
[Vol. 2
1981] HARDROCK MINING 73
plan, it would seem that a title holding patentee must be in a better
position.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This overview is intended to give some insight into hardrock min-
ing on the public domain and should provide the practitioner with a
handy set of references to basic mining law. In my view both mineral
development and environmental protection are in the national interest.
The public land law now developing must insure that these concerns
are properly balanced.

